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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Todd appeals from the judgment and sentence entered upon his plea of 
guilty to felony grand theft by false pretenses and/or embezzlement. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Over a period of about three years, Todd stole at least $57,000.00 from 
his employer. (PSI, pp.2, 11-12.1) Working as a hotel manager, Todd deposited 
into his personal account funds paid by customers for stays at the hotel. (Id.) 
The hotel owner also put Todd in charge of renting out another property and 
Todd collected a tenant's rent payment for himself, but told the owner he could 
not find a renter. (Id.) 
The state filed an information charging Todd with felony grand theft by 
false pretenses and/or embezzlement, in violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-
2403(1 )(2)(b) and 18-2407(1)(b). (R., pp.27-29.) Todd pied guilty and completed 
a presentence investigation. (R., pp.36-43; see generally, 11/6/07 Change of 
Plea Tr. and PSI.) The district court entered Judgment, imposed a unified 
sentence of twelve years with four years fixed and ordered restitution in the 
amount of $57,083.96. (R., pp.44-55, 57-58; 1/7/08 Sentencing Tr., hereinafter 
"1/7/08 Tr.," p.54, Ls.21-22, p.61, Ls.7-13.) Todd timely appealed. (R., pp.59-
62.) 
1 Pages of attachments to the PSI are numbered sequentially to the PSI pages. 
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ISSUES 
Todd states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Were Mr. Todd's rights under both the Due Process Clause 
and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
violated when the district court based its decision to impose 
a long prison sentence upon Mr. Todd based in part on his 
inability to pay the restitution actually imposed? 
2. Alternatively, did the district court abuse its discretion by 
imposing a unified sentence of twelve years, with four years 
fixed, upon Mr. Todd based on his indigency [sic] and by 
failing to consider the mitigating factors present in his case? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Todd failed to preserve his violation of due process claims for appeal, 
and, even if his claims are properly before this court, has Todd failed to 
establish that the district court violated those rights when it imposed a 
prison sentence upon him? 
2. Has Todd failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion 
when it imposed a twelve year sentence with four years fixed upon Todd's 




Todd Failed To Preserve His Violation Of Due Process Claims For Appeal And 
Even If His Claims Are Properly Before This Court, The District Court Did Not 
Violate Those Rights When It Imposed A Prison Sentence Upon Him 
A. Introduction 
Todd asserts that his "rights under both the Due Process Clause and the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were [violated] when the 
district court imposed a lengthy prison sentence almost entirely based upon his 
indigent status." (Appellant"s brief, pp.11.) Todd's claims fail because he failed 
to preserve his due process claims for appeal, and the district court appropriately 
imposed sentence based upon the criteria found in I.C. § 19-2526. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues such 
as a claimed due process violation is one of deference to factual findings, unless 
they are clearly erroneous, but free review of whether constitutional requirements 
have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 
380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 2003). 
C. Todd Failed To Preserve His Violation Of Due Process Claims For Appeal 
For the first time on appeal, Todd claims that "the district court violated 
[his] rights under both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment" when it "imposed a lengthy prison sentence, 
based 'heavily' on [Todd's] inability to pay restitution." (Appellant"s brief, p.4.) 
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Todd acknowledges that he "did not object to ... the district court's oral 
statements that it was going to 'heavily' consider [Todd's] indigent status in 
imposing a stiff prison sentence." (Appellant's brief, pp.5-6.) "It is a fundamental 
tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must be made in the trial 
court before an issue is preserved for appeal." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 
398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). "Issues not raised before the trial court may 
not be considered for the first time on appeal." State v. Adams, 138 Idaho 624, 
628, 67 P.3d 103, 107 (Ct. App. 2003). As such, Todd's claims are not properly 
before this court. 
An unpreserved issue may be raised for the first time on appeal if the error 
claimed is fundamental. State v. McAway, 127 Idaho 54, 60, 896 P.2d 962, 968 
(1995); State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 844, 828 P.2d 871, 873 (1992). 
Fundamental error has been defined as one that "goes to the foundation or basis 
of a defendant's rights or must go to the foundation of the case or take from the 
defendant a right which was essential to his defense and which no court could or 
ought to permit him to waive." State v. Knowlton, 123 Idaho 916, 918, 854 P.2d 
259, 261 (1993). An error is fundamental when it so profoundly distorts the 
proceedings that it "produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his 
fundamental right to due process." State v. Mccutcheon, 129 Idaho 168, 169, 
922 P.2d 1094, 1095 (Ct. App 1996) (citing Lavy, 121 Idaho at 844, 828 P.2d at 
873; State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178,180,824 P.2d 109,111 (1991)). 
Before the appellate court will engage in a fundamental error analysis, the 
appellant must establish that the trial court committed an error. State v. 
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Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 749, 170 P.3d 886, 892 (2007). Todd has failed to 
show fundamental error justifying appellate review. Todd asks this Court to 
review his claim under the fundamental error doctrine, arguing that the district 
deprived him of due process by considering, for sentencing purposes, Todd's 
ablility to compensate the victim for losses Todd inflicted. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.5-6.) Todd has not cited a single case prohibiting a sentencing court from 
considering a defendant's ability to pay restitution when that court imposes 
sentence. Idaho Code§ 19-2526 sets forth certain criteria a court may consider 
for sentencing purposes; Todd has not challenged the constitutionality of this 
statute either. As explained more fully below in subsection D., the district court's 
application of this statutorily authorized sentencing factor when imposing 
sentence upon Todd was not an error, much less a fundamental error. 
D. Even If Todd's Claims Are Properly Before This Court, The District Court 
Did Not Violate Todd's Due Process Rights When It Imposed Sentence 
A sentencing court's decision between imprisonment and probation is one 
of discretion. State v. Hathaway, 111 Idaho 844, 727 P.2d 1272 (Ct App. 1986). 
Idaho Code § 18-2526 provides a sentencing court with certain criteria to 
consider when making this decision. The payment of, or ability to pay restitution 
is but one ground a sentencing court may weigh in favor of probation: 
(2) The following grounds, while not controlling the 
discretion of the court, shall be accorded weight in favor of 
avoiding a sentence of imprisonment: 
(f) The defendant has compensated or will compensate the 
victim of his criminal conduct for the damage or injury that was 
sustained; provided, however, nothing in this section shall prevent 
the appropriate use of imprisonment and restitution in combination. 
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I.C. § 19-2526 (2)(f). Todd claims the district court violated his due process 
rights by considering Todd's ability to pay restitution when it imposed sentence, a 
consideration, as stated above, that is specifically authorized by statute. Todd, 
however, does not even address or challenge the constitutionality of Idaho's 
sentencing statute. 
Instead, Todd's claim relies upon U.S Supreme Court and Idaho case law 
that is either inapplicable or not on point. (See, Appellant's brief, pp.4-11.) None 
of the cases Todd cites address whether or not a sentencing court may consider 
a defendant's inability to pay restitution at the time it initially imposes sentence. 
For example, in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), the defendant had 
already been granted probation. The issue was whether probation could be 
revoked for failure to pay a fine or restitution. kl at 665; see also, State v. 
Braaten, 144 Idaho 606, 167 P.3d 357 (Ct. App. 2007). The Beardon Court 
explained the general rule concerning imprisonment of a defendant based only 
upon indigency: 
The rule of Williams2 and Tate3, then, is that the State 
cannot "impos[e] a fine as a sentence and then automatically 
conver[t] it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent 
and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full." In other words, if the 
State determines a fine or restitution to be the appropriate and 
adequate penalty for the crime, it may not thereafter imprison a 
person solely because he lacked the resources to pay it. 
2 Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (holding that a state cannot imprison 
indigent defendants beyond the statutory maximum based solely their inability to 
ray a fine). 
Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (holding that a state cannot convert a fine 
imposed under a fine-only statute into a jail term based solely on an indigent 
defendant's inability to pay a fine in full). 
6 
461 U.S. at 667-68 (internal citations omitted). Here, the sentencing court did not 
impose restitution then convert it to a prison term because Todd could not pay 
the restitution. The court ordered restitution and specifically declined imposing a 
fine along with imposing a term of incarceration. (R., pp.44-55, 57-58; 1/7/08 Tr., 
p.61, Ls.7-13.) The court did not even impose the maximum term of confinement 
for Todd's crime.4 Also of note is the fact that Todd actually stipulated to the 
restitution order at sentencing. (R., p.56; 1/7/08 Tr., p.54, Ls.12-20.) 
When the court sentenced Todd, it determined that probation and 
restitution were not adequate penalties for the crime. Instead, the district court 
appropriately examined the sentencing criteria laid out in I.C. § 19-2526. The 
court considered Todd's prior similar offenses, "there's two prior felonies for 
taking other people's property, checks, paper, that type of thing." (1/7/08 Tr., 
p.58, Ls.14-15.) The court noted that in terms of deterrence, Todd had "already 
been in prison for [theft]" (1/7/08 Tr., p.58, L.16), and "[the crime] didn't stop 
because Mr. Todd stopped it. It stopped because he got caught ... there's 
nothing to indicate that Mr. Todd would have stopped this on his own." (1/7/08 
Tr., p.58, Ls19-22). In addition, the court addressed the need to deter and 
protect the public from this type of crime, stating, "you can't let people embezzle 
$57,000 from a local business and walk away and give them probation" (1/7/08 
Tr., p.60, Ls.10-11 ), and "I can't look at the citizens of this county and say that's 
4 I.C. § 18-2408(2)(a) provides that theft by false pretenses and/or embezzlement 
is "punishable by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000), or 
imprisonment ... for not less than one (1) year nor more than fourteen (14) 
years, or by both such fine and imprisonment." 
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okay, probation is okay. I can't do it. I owe the public [and the victim] that much . 
. . it requires a prison sentence" (1/7/08 Tr., p.60, L.25 - p.61, L.3.) 
The district court did not violate Todd's due process rights when it 
considered the sentencing criteria found in I.C. § 19-2526 and exercised its 
discretion by imposing a prison sentence instead of placing Todd on probation. 
As such, this Court should affirm the district court's judgment and sentence. 
11. 
Todd Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
When It Imposed A Twelve Year Sentence With Four Years Fixed Upon His Plea 
Of Guilty To Felony Grand Theft By False Pretenses And/Or Embezzlement 
A. Introduction 
Todd argues in the alternative that the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion by "imposing a lengthy sentence based on his indigent status" 
(Appellant's brief p.12), and failing to adequately consider mitigating factors, 
including his remorse and "acceptance of responsibility for his criminal behavior" 
(Id.} along with the age of Todd's prior convictions for theft (Id., at pp.13-14). 
Considering any view of the facts, Todd has failed to establish that the district 
court abused its discretion by imposing four years fixed for felony grand theft by 
false pretenses and/or embezzlement. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a defendant alleges an excessive sentence on appeal the appellate 
court conducts an independent review of the record that considers the nature of 
the offense, the defendant's character and protection of society. State v. Reinke, 
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103 Idaho 771, 772, 653 P .2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 1982). "Absent a showing of 
a clear abuse of discretion, a sentence within statutory limits will not be disturbed 
on appeal." State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 604, 768 P.2d 1331, 1337 (1989). 
C. The District Court Acted Within Its Discretion In Imposing A Twelve Year 
Sentence With Four Years Fixed Upon Todd's Guilty Plea To Felony 
Grand Theft By False Pretenses And/Or Embezzlement 
To determine whether the trial court abused its sentencing discretion, an 
appellate court independently reviews "all of the facts and circumstances of the 
case," including the record, and considers the nature of the offense and the 
character of the offender. State v. Cope, 142 Idaho 492, 500, 129 P.3d 1241, 
1249 (2006). To prevail, the appellant must establish that, under any reasonable 
view of the facts, the sentence is excessive considering the objectives of criminal 
punishment. State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005). 
Those objectives are "(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual 
and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment 
or retribution for wrongdoing." State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 671, 978 P.2d 227, 
231 (1999) (internal citations omitted). 
Todd argues that the district court abused its sentencing discretion not 
only by violating Todd's due process rights, but also by not adequately 
considering the age of his criminal history, his acceptance of responsibility and 
remorse for his actions. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-14.) While Todd's arguments 
may have some relevancy to sentencing, a sentencing court is not required to 
assess or balance all of the sentencing goals in an equal manner. State v. 
Dushkin, 124 Idaho 184, 186, 857 P.2d 663,665 (Ct. App. 1993). 
9 
Although Todd's prior offenses occurred in the late 1970s through the mid-
1980s, those crimes are very similar to the one at hand. (PSI, pp.3-4, 8.) Todd's 
prior convictions involved stealing and depositing a check that belonged to his 
employer, keeping rent money for himself while working for an apartment 
complex, and passing bad checks. (PSI, pp.4, 8.) Todd violated probation in the 
bad check case by committing a new felony theft, then later violated parole by 
not reporting to his parole officer. (Id.) Here, over a period of three years, Todd 
deposited checks made out to his employer into his personal account. (PSI, 
pp.2, 11-12.) During this time Todd also kept rent money he collected on a 
property owned by his employer, while claiming he had not been able to rent the 
property. (Id.) 
Although Todd eventually claimed to have accepted responsibility and 
expressed remorse for his actions, when first confronted with his crime, Todd 
"stated he had inadvertently deposited a check belonging to [his employer] into 
his personal account." (PSI, p.2.) "[Todd] claimed he had not intended to steal 
the check, and that it was purely accidental." (PSI, p.11.) In terms of 
rehabilitation or restitution, the district court correctly pointed out: 
[T]his isn't a case where [Todd] is a welder or a car mechanic or 
he does something that doesn't involve handling money. He's a 
hotel manager by profession, and in order to be employed in a 
good paying capacity it would probably require him to be in a 
position of trust, which with three felonies I can't see that 
happening. 
(1/7/08 Tr., p.57, L.22 - p.58, L.3.) Todd's prior criminal history, his past failures 
at probation and parole, combined with the nature of all his crimes, call for 
incarceration instead of probation in order to fulfill the sentencing goals of 
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deterring Todd from re-offending, deterring others from this type of crime, and 
protecting society. Todd has failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The State respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment and 
sentence. 
DATED this 10th day of December 2008. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 10th day of December 2008, served 
a true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
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